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Does The « Working Poor » Exist ?
Social Experts, Unions and the Poverty Question in the Age of Erosion of
the Union Idea
Romain Huret
1 Nelson Lichtenstein’s State of the Union is a major accomplishment: a piece of work that
moves us closer to the understanding of the historical role of unions. This rich synthesis
is both a story of American workers and an attempt to reinvigorate Labor History. The
chapters dealing with the post‑war decades provide a fresh and stimulating analysis.
Above all,  Lichtenstein parts ways with the theory of the “labor‑management accord”
after World War Two, and he reconsiders the efforts of  liberals and labor reformers,
notably in the 1950s and 1960s. While he debunks the idea that the working class had
become submissive at that time, he also argues that liberal policymakers helped set up a
system of industrial relations that the workers would not have obtained alone. Like any
impressive book, State of the Union has areas where the analysis could have been stronger,
notably to explain the decline of unions during the 1950s and 1960s.
2 In the second part of the book, Lichtenstein pays considerable attention to these two
decades, one of the key periods of the 20th century. Indeed, the the main focus of the book
revolves around the emergence of unions in the first decades of the century and the
beginning of their decline after the World War Two. To explain the slow erosion of the
union idea, Lichtenstein singles out four main causes: the rise of Big Labor, which gave
birth  to  political  and  judiciary  backlash  (141‑148  and  162‑166);  radical  and  liberal
disenchantment  which  led  intellectuals  to  remain  aloof  from  unions  and  the  labor
question (149‑162); a generational trend with the emergence of the New Left (160‑162)
and the shift from a model of collective work rights to individual work rights (178‑182). I
would add one more reason: the unions’ failure to encompass the “labor question” within
a larger “social question.”
3 At the beginning of his book, Lichtenstein argues that the tension between the “labor
question” and the “social question” had been central during the progressive era, as Alan
Dawley has clearly shown.1 Above all, the Depression blurs the lines between the social
question  and  the  labor  question  with  the  key  to  recovery  and  economic  stability
depending on an increase in the workers’  purchasing power.  I  would argue that this
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tension  resurfaced  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  two  decades  of  tremendous  economic
prosperity.  While  the  “labor  question”  seems  to  disappear  from  the  mainstream  of
American politics, many liberals put the “social question” at the top of their political
agenda. The labor movement failed, nevertheless, to participate in any of the changes
that took place during the 1960s and 1970s, most notably what Lichtenstein refers to as
the “rights revolution.” Rather than being assertive in seeking constructive change for
America’s dispossessed (racial minorities, women and the poor), organized labor barely
took notice of what was happening, other than to issue occasional ritualized statements
of support.
4 Paradoxically, while the book tends to rehabilitate the impact of state policies and the
work  of  liberals  in  the  course  of  the  twentieth  century,  Lichtenstein  maintains  a
traditional critical tone towards the War on Poverty, launched by Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson in the fall of 1963. 
5 While State of  the Union integrates the most recent literature on poverty,  the poverty
question is viewed in a rather traditional  way (194‑198).  It is  important to note that
Lichtenstein clearly shows how the poverty question helped redefine the social question
for  New Left  intellectuals  such as  Michael  Harrington in his  famous book,  The  Other
America, published in 1962. One of the main arguments of Michael Harrington was the
poor’s lack of political power. Hence, Lichtenstein quotes Harrington: 
The dispossessed at the bottom of the society are unable to speak for themselves.
The people of  the other America do not,  by far  and large,  belong to unions,  to
fraternal organizations,  or to political  parties.  They are without lobbies of their
own; they put forward no legislative program (State of the Union, 161).
6 Lichtenstein then makes a clear distinction between the empowerment strategy of the
Johnson administration and the old‑left wing liberal thinkers such as Leon Keyserling. He
criticizes the War on Poverty for “blaming the victim,” to quote William Ryan’s famous
book.2 Lichtenstein’s argument goes much further: as most historians contend, Johnson’s
social reforms focused more on the psychological components of poverty than on the
social  and  economic  aspects:  Lichtenstein  has  far  more  evidence  about  the  lack  of
structural reforms in the labor‑market, often denounced by New Left historians.3 Indeed,
it is a well‑known fact that the Labor Department and his Secretary, Willard Wirtz, were
strongly against the Community Action Programs.4 Instead, the Department pushed for
intensified  training,  targeted  economic  development  and  substantial  job  creation
initiatives.
7 Unions, on the other hand, cautiously endorsed the War on Poverty even though they had
a long‑standing interest in the poverty question. As early as February 1959, the AFL‑CIO’s
Department  of  research  refuted  the  contention  that  “there  were  no  impoverished
Americans any more” by citing the estimated number of persons in 1957 who were either
members of families with incomes below $3,000 or unrelated individuals with incomes
below $1,500.5 A somewhat expanded version of this information was incorporated into a
resolution on “Aiding America’s Lowest Income Families” at the September 1959 AFL‑CIO
Convention.6 Thus, when the War on Poverty was launched, unions remained skeptical
towards the goals of the Community Action Programs and the Job Corps. One year after
the launching of the War on Poverty, United Auto Workers decided to finance the Citizens
Crusade Against Poverty, a grassroots movement whose main goal was to empower the
poor. 7
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8 In State of the Union, Lichtenstein shares this traditional skepticism, taking for granted the
antagonism between social experts and labor reformers. A labor historian by training, he
naturally tends to emphasize exogenous factors such as technology or social strife that
seem to shape the limits of social policy. There are several points in the book where the
importance of labor reformers, not to say liberal policymakers in terms of shaping social
policy, appears to be somewhat secondary in comparison to dramatic technological or
social changes, especially for the 1950s and 1960s, which were not, Lichtenstein argues,
devoid of social strife. It seems to me that from a historical standpoint, the book would
have  been stronger  had  it  been more  aware  of the  poverty  debate  within  the  poor
community and looked more seriously at the diversity of reforms promoted by experts
within the Federal Administration. In State of the Union, the bureaucracy remains a passive
body that expands through inertia or in response to external forces.8 Therefore, it is easy
to reduce the stakes of the War on Poverty to an alternative among psychological or work
factors and a choice between job training or job programs. 
9 While  most  historians  still  emphasize  the  differences  between  liberals  and  labor
reformers, notably New Left historians in the 70s and 80s, I would like to demonstrate
that each group shared a common analysis of the poverty question in focusing on the
specific  category  of  the  “working  poor.”9 Contrary  to  what  many  historians  have
generally assumed, federal bureaucracies and unions were not inherently in conflict as
far as analysis of this question is concerned.10 Antagonism arose more from the social
tools which were promoted than from the social diagnostic that has been made at the
time. Indeed, a common analysis of the poverty question was made during the 1950s and
developed further in the 1960s when the Federal  Government promoted the poverty
question as a central concern for the nation. In my opinion, one does not have to wait for
the 1970s and Nixon’s “working‑poor” rhetoric to see poverty experts focusing on this
specific group.11 
10 First and foremost, the economist Robert Lampman played a major role in shaping the
limits of the “working poor” as a group. The “intellectual father” of the War on Poverty,
in James Tobin’s words, was the heir of the Wisconsin school tradition, even if he tried to
reinvigorate  the  analysis  of  the  Commons’  generation.12 Although  Lampman’s
dissertation  was  straight  out  of  the  Wisconsin  tradition,  he  began  to  shift  from
institutionalist theory to Keynes and neoclassical labor market theory during the 1950s.
At that time, he challenged the “income revolution” theory heralded by economist Simon
Kuznets,13 and showed that wealth holdings remained highly concentrated at the top of
the  income  level.  In  1959,  he  worked  for  Illinois  Senator  Paul  Douglas  and  refuted
Galbraith’s famous thesis about poverty.14 Indeed, he debunked Galbraith’s contention
that the poor would not benefit from economic growth, becoming one of the leading
experts of the country in the poverty field. Thus, his 1959 work for Senator Douglas drew
the attention of  Walter Heller  when he became chairman of  the Kennedy Council  of
Economic Advisers.15 As he entered Heller’s Council  for Economic Advisers,  Lampman
shaped a new definition of poverty, more concerned with the main category of poor
people—the  working  poor.  The  typical  “working  poor”  family  was  two‑parent,
male‑headed, and white. According to Lampman, more than 90 percent of the “working
poor” received no benefits at all. In some states, working families in some states made
less from employment than Aid to Families with Dependent Children families made from
being on “welfare.” 
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11 As he looked for means to reduce poverty,  Lampman blamed the dual social security
system: according to him, neither social insurance, nor welfare helped the poor. During
the Task Force on Poverty of February 1964, the economist tried to promote this idea of
focusing on the working poor. Nevertheless, he disagreed with the Labor Department’s
experts about the creation of strong employment programs; he believed that reducing
unemployment  would  not  solve  the  poverty  problem.  To  understand  this  specific
standpoint, one has to know Lampman’s theory about poverty. During his years spent at
the CEA, he distinguished the poverty rate and the “poverty income gap,” which was
defined as “the aggregate amount by which the present poor population’s income falls
short of $3,000 per family or $1,500 per unrelated individuals.”16 Indeed, job programs
could improve the poverty rate but not reduce the poverty income gap. Therefore, he
imagined an income‑transfer program, which would reduce the poverty income gap (in
1963, this gap was about $12 billion or 2% of GNP).
12 Nevertheless, Sargent Shriver and Lyndon Johnson decided to promote the empowerment
strategy to help poor people, by launching both the Job Corps and the Community Action
Programs. I would add here that for social experts such as Robert Lampman, the War on
Poverty  was  a  Pyrrhic  victory  since  it  was  a  weak  reform,  focusing  only  on  the
psychological aspects of poverty and promoting job training as the panacea to eradicating
poverty. Contrary to what Nelson Lichtenstein contends, the War on Poverty was also a
failure for many liberals within the Johnson administration.17
13 Paradoxically,  left‑wing  thinker  Leon  Keyserling  shared  this  analysis.  As  Nelson
Lichtenstein argues, Keyserling remained the spokesman of many union members at the
beginning of the Sixties.18 One of the last New Deal figures still involved in politics, he was
deeply opposed to the growth strategy developed by the Eisenhower’s CEA and by Walter
Heller’s CEA when he became chairman of Kennedy’s CEA. During the 1950s, Keyserling
created the Conference on Economic Progress (CEP), a left‑wing organization whose aim
was  to  rethink the  liberal  policy.19 In  May 1957,  the  CEP published a  study entitled
Consumption: Key to Full Prosperity.20 The staff work for the study was undertaken by Mary
Dublin Keyserling and Philip Ritz, under the direction of Leon Keyserling. In a section on
“Poverty‑ridden  Consumers,”  the  CEP  set  $4,000  as  a  “minimum  adequate  living
standard” for families and $3,000 for unrelated individuals. In 1962, the Conference on
Economic Progress published another study in order to stress the growth of poor people,
living below the poverty line.21 The pamphlet strongly criticized the tax cut promoted by
Heller. Indeed, Keyserling refused to distinguish between unemployment and poverty, as
he believed that slow growth and unemployment had put 40% of American households at
“poverty” (below $4,000) or “deprivation” (below $6,000) levels. This distinction between
“poverty” and “deprivation” was made to include the category of “working poor.” Both
for Keyserling and the CEP, the group of “working poor” was also at the core of the
poverty question. 
14 Yet, in spite of the common analysis relative to the extent of poverty, poverty experts and
labor reformers disagreed on the ways and means to solve poverty.
15 For liberals such as Lampman, traditional methods of social reform, promoted by unions,
were outdated in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, in 1957, Bob Lampman blamed unions for
their conservatism:
It  is  typically  an  exclusive  movement  aimed  at  giving  preference  to  “regular”
workers and those having seniority. It should be borne in mind that union members
are, generally speaking, in the upper half of the income distribution.22
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16 When Lampman became a full  member of  the CEA,  he made countless  speeches and
comments in front of union members and felt deeply disappointed by their lack of
reaction. In June 1963, both Lampman and Walter Heller addressed the annual convention
of the Communication Workers of America.  Thinking this was a supportive audience,
Lampman tested the idea of a comprehensive assault on poverty. Although some union
members were interested in the tax cut, Lampman lost his audience nonetheless when he
spoke about poverty. Thanks to his links within the Federal Administration, Lampman
used the many task forces on poverty and income distribution to push for a negative
income tax,  the  best  way to  reduce  the  poverty  income gap.  According to  him,  the
negative income tax had to replace the welfare side of the social security system, reputed
to be ineffective. The idea was an easy one: people below the low‑income bracket didn’t
pay taxes so they could not benefit from exemptions and deductions from the tax system.
Thus the Federal Government had to give them a tax credit corresponding to exemptions
and deductions through the negative income tax system.
17 During  the  1960s,  unions  deeply  opposed  these  kinds  of  universal  income‑transfer
programs, even though, as Alan Derickson has shown, they had been strongly in favor,
during the previous decade, of the same universal reforms.23 Within the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations, their fierce opposition was used by top‑level bureaucrats such
as Wilbur Cohen to refuse to endorse a reform of the welfare side of the social security
system.24 Indeed, cooperation remained strong between union leaders and conservative
liberals like Cohen as far as the social question was concerned. At the end of the decade,
however, they decided to abandon the goal of protection for the entire population and
strongly  endorsed  the  “salami  slicing”  policy  of  the  Kennedy  and  Johnson
administrations, to use Wilbur Cohen’s famous words. This strategy was based on the
promotion  of  the  insurance  side  of  the social  security  system,  which  was  made  for
middle‑class and regular workers. Social policy therefore remained targeted on specific
groups of the population, whereas unions continued to refuse new proposals for social
engineering focused on the entire population, such as the negative income tax. 
18 Seen from the perspective of poverty question, State of the Union remains a traditional
account,  which still  postulates that post‑war social  policies collapsed from their own
conservatism.  For Lichtenstein,  historical  analyses revolve around social  demand.  My
paper contends that it is worth treating the bureaucracy as a serious political force in its
own right, particularly below the level of department secretaries. Perhaps the final stage
of  rehabilitation  of  liberal  reformers  during  the  New  Deal  Order  is  to  reveal  how
appointed  bureaucrats  crafted  agendas,  sold  their  agencies  and  ultimately  tried  to
convince elected officials and unions to move forward on programs they had designed. In
focusing  on  the  central  role  of  middle‑level  bureaucrats  such  as  Robert  Lampman,
Lichtenstein’s analysis could have avoided the trap of claiming that the War on Poverty
was only a psychological program shaped by conservative liberals. By claiming a reform
of the American tax system, Lampman posited a new way of implementing social reforms
only to encounter union apathy. It seems clear to me that these two decades were a “lost
opportunity,” since poverty experts and labor reformers shared the same analysis of the
extent of poverty in the country.25 Unable to find a common ground to combat poverty,
they  allowed  the  most  conservative  liberals  within  the  Johnson  administration  to
promote a consensual and inefficient approach to solving this social question. 
19 Thus, it is no coincidence that Nixon should have used the “working poor” category as a
way of consensus to redefine the social contract and endorse a sort of Negative Income
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Tax with the Family Assistance Plan. Under Nixon, the “working poor” entered the public
arena and became a political category used for conservative reforms. Later, the Earned
Income tax Credit  (1976)  was designed to help the specific  category of  the “working
poor.” It is one of the more complex failures of both labor reformers and experts during
the 1950s and 1960s, that of designing a common ground to solve the burden of poor
people  in  post‑war America.  In  the  1970s,  Nixon’s  anti‑union rhetoric,  based on the
“working poor,” could have become labor and liberal rhetoric for the development of
social democracy in the country.
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